‘Tjilik Riwut Strategy’ to Guard Indigenous Harmony
Moh Yasir Alimi, A SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE CENTER FOR MULTICULTURALISM,
DEMOCRACY AND CHARACTER BUILDING, SEMARANG STATE UNIVERSITY
Sumber : JAKARTA POST, 14Februari 2012
There is now an effective strategy to combat religious violence and the influence of violent groups: Surround their plane and prohibit propagators of violence from disembarking and stepping foot on your land.
This strategy can also be metaphorical: Surround the carriers of violence, prevent inciters of violence from spreading influence in your land to destroy the long-standing tradition of tolerance.
This strategy can be called the “Tjilik Riwut” strategy; a strategy demonstrated by local Dayak protesters who refused to permit the presence of an organization that often incites violence, disharmony and intimidation in many parts of Indonesia.
Motivated by the desire to protect indigenous peace and religious harmony in Central Kalimantan, local protesters surrounded a plane carrying four senior officials of the Islam Defenders Front (FPI) who had come there to inaugurate a branch of their organization in Central Kalimatan.
The four FPI elites were eventually forced by local authorities to fly to Banjarmasin. Commenting on the incident, a colleague said, “Imagine if in Banjarmasin they were surrounded by another mob and were forced to fly to Jakarta. And if in Jakarta they were surrounded by another mob. Perhaps such a strategy will end the violence, intimidation and the raids of this organization against religious minorities.”
A similar case occurred in 2008. Banser, the youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), dissolved the branch of the organization in Jember, East Java, after the paramilitary organization insulted Gus Dur, then chief patron of NU, and attacked peaceful protesters in National Monument (Monas), Central Jakarta, celebrating the anniversary of Pancasila.
Enraged by the insult, Banser also raided FPI members in Lamongan, East Java, and “marked” individuals who had become members of the FPI after the incident in Monas. At the same time, the National Declaration Movement was initiated in Bali and was dedicated to shielding the nation from the rising influence of radicalism.
The rejections of the Dayak community in Kalimantan, Muslims and non-Muslims in Bali, Java and many other areas in Indonesia make sense. Indonesian communities — Muslims and non-Muslims — are fed up with the organization, which has incited violence in the name of religion, but still remains untouchable.
Violent organizations, or organized thugs, are a real challenge to state authorities. When the state seems to be powerless against vigilantes, people will move to protect their dignity.
Since its declaration in 1998, the FPI has set upon systematic nationwide acts of violence. It has incited many vigilante actions against, among others, Ahmadiyah followers and the congregation of the HKBP Church in Bekasi, West Java.
Rather than maintaining a marginal image, violence, including coercion, intimidation, raids, destruction of property and violence, has been the central strategic aspects of the FPI movement. The FPI has been willing to use violence and intimidation as its main tactics in building influence.
Not only non-Muslims, Muslims alike are also the targets of the FPI. The FPI has intimidated activists from the Islamic Liberal Network (JIL), attacked peaceful protesters celebrating religious freedom in Monas, and damaged statues in public spaces that they deemed un-Islamic. In Purwakarta, West Java, statues representing characters of widely popular local puppet theater, such as Bima, Werkudara and Janaka, were destroyed.
The FPI’s main activities traditionally focused on raiding night clubs selling alcohol. The activities of the organization, however, have been expanded to intervention in conflicts over places of worship in Jakarta and its surrounding areas. The most recent case was the damage caused to the front entrance of Home Ministry.
The activities reveal that there has been a major ideological transformation within the organization. It was first in the form of the Pamswakarsa militia created by the Indonesian Military (TNI) during the reformasi era to guard the peaceful transition to democracy, but was only centered in Jakarta.
The organization, however, has become a very active organization and is widespread across the country. Researchers, such as Zachary Abuza, estimate that the FPI claims about 100,000 members and has branches in 22 provinces.
According to Ian Wilson, since 2003 the FPI has transformed itself from “an unruly bunch of thugs in religious garb” to “a far more disciplined and ideologically oriented paramilitary force”.
What needs to be considered given such a transformation is that the new terrorists grew out of vigilantism, as exemplified in the case of Ahmad Syarip, the suicide bomber of a mosque in Cirebon. Syarip had been actively involved in the raids against alcohol and in intimidation against Ahmadiyah followers.
Moral reasoning has been the argument often used by the organization to justify its actions. But the transformation has illustrated that the organization was no longer the organization as we knew it during the New Order era.
It is now an organization which confidently uses violence. That is why it threatens the foundational principles of a secular democratic state. Moreover, in its mission statement, it is stated that the organization is dedicated to the complete implementation of sharia (kaffah).
Analyzing violent groups in the post-New Order Indonesia, Ian Wilson observed that paramilitary groups, such as the FPI, are a major challenge to restoring confidence in state institutions. To restore public trust in state institutions, the government should have a clear cut action plan to deal with violent organizations.
Grown out of the Pamswakarsa, the FPI previously received support from the Jakarta Police and the TNI commander at that time: Gen. Wiranto. The links between certain elites and the FPI have been a source of FPI confidence.
The elites have nothing to do with religion, but their interest in the FPI is related to jockeying for political influence. The strength of the FPI represents the weaknesses of the government against violent organizations and the elites behind them.
“Surrounding the Tjilik Riwut plane strategy” is an expression of civil frustration against the ignorance of the central government in guarding long-standing religious tolerance and freedom. They are tired of language games played by the certain Jakarta elites in regard to these organizations.
In response to the ban in Central Kalimantan, the FPI elites said that the event “could potentially cause horizontal conflict and threaten the stability of the nation”. They also say that freedom of expression is not protected here. These statements are more relevant if addressed to the organization itself, rather than the Dayak protesters.
To protect religious harmony, the state could adopt the Tjilik Riwut strategy by suppressing the trend of religious violence through compulsory adherence of every organization to the guiding principles of Pancasila. This strategy could at least curb radical organizations from gathering further political influence. ●
This strategy can also be metaphorical: Surround the carriers of violence, prevent inciters of violence from spreading influence in your land to destroy the long-standing tradition of tolerance.
This strategy can be called the “Tjilik Riwut” strategy; a strategy demonstrated by local Dayak protesters who refused to permit the presence of an organization that often incites violence, disharmony and intimidation in many parts of Indonesia.
Motivated by the desire to protect indigenous peace and religious harmony in Central Kalimantan, local protesters surrounded a plane carrying four senior officials of the Islam Defenders Front (FPI) who had come there to inaugurate a branch of their organization in Central Kalimatan.
The four FPI elites were eventually forced by local authorities to fly to Banjarmasin. Commenting on the incident, a colleague said, “Imagine if in Banjarmasin they were surrounded by another mob and were forced to fly to Jakarta. And if in Jakarta they were surrounded by another mob. Perhaps such a strategy will end the violence, intimidation and the raids of this organization against religious minorities.”
A similar case occurred in 2008. Banser, the youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), dissolved the branch of the organization in Jember, East Java, after the paramilitary organization insulted Gus Dur, then chief patron of NU, and attacked peaceful protesters in National Monument (Monas), Central Jakarta, celebrating the anniversary of Pancasila.
Enraged by the insult, Banser also raided FPI members in Lamongan, East Java, and “marked” individuals who had become members of the FPI after the incident in Monas. At the same time, the National Declaration Movement was initiated in Bali and was dedicated to shielding the nation from the rising influence of radicalism.
The rejections of the Dayak community in Kalimantan, Muslims and non-Muslims in Bali, Java and many other areas in Indonesia make sense. Indonesian communities — Muslims and non-Muslims — are fed up with the organization, which has incited violence in the name of religion, but still remains untouchable.
Violent organizations, or organized thugs, are a real challenge to state authorities. When the state seems to be powerless against vigilantes, people will move to protect their dignity.
Since its declaration in 1998, the FPI has set upon systematic nationwide acts of violence. It has incited many vigilante actions against, among others, Ahmadiyah followers and the congregation of the HKBP Church in Bekasi, West Java.
Rather than maintaining a marginal image, violence, including coercion, intimidation, raids, destruction of property and violence, has been the central strategic aspects of the FPI movement. The FPI has been willing to use violence and intimidation as its main tactics in building influence.
Not only non-Muslims, Muslims alike are also the targets of the FPI. The FPI has intimidated activists from the Islamic Liberal Network (JIL), attacked peaceful protesters celebrating religious freedom in Monas, and damaged statues in public spaces that they deemed un-Islamic. In Purwakarta, West Java, statues representing characters of widely popular local puppet theater, such as Bima, Werkudara and Janaka, were destroyed.
The FPI’s main activities traditionally focused on raiding night clubs selling alcohol. The activities of the organization, however, have been expanded to intervention in conflicts over places of worship in Jakarta and its surrounding areas. The most recent case was the damage caused to the front entrance of Home Ministry.
The activities reveal that there has been a major ideological transformation within the organization. It was first in the form of the Pamswakarsa militia created by the Indonesian Military (TNI) during the reformasi era to guard the peaceful transition to democracy, but was only centered in Jakarta.
The organization, however, has become a very active organization and is widespread across the country. Researchers, such as Zachary Abuza, estimate that the FPI claims about 100,000 members and has branches in 22 provinces.
According to Ian Wilson, since 2003 the FPI has transformed itself from “an unruly bunch of thugs in religious garb” to “a far more disciplined and ideologically oriented paramilitary force”.
What needs to be considered given such a transformation is that the new terrorists grew out of vigilantism, as exemplified in the case of Ahmad Syarip, the suicide bomber of a mosque in Cirebon. Syarip had been actively involved in the raids against alcohol and in intimidation against Ahmadiyah followers.
Moral reasoning has been the argument often used by the organization to justify its actions. But the transformation has illustrated that the organization was no longer the organization as we knew it during the New Order era.
It is now an organization which confidently uses violence. That is why it threatens the foundational principles of a secular democratic state. Moreover, in its mission statement, it is stated that the organization is dedicated to the complete implementation of sharia (kaffah).
Analyzing violent groups in the post-New Order Indonesia, Ian Wilson observed that paramilitary groups, such as the FPI, are a major challenge to restoring confidence in state institutions. To restore public trust in state institutions, the government should have a clear cut action plan to deal with violent organizations.
Grown out of the Pamswakarsa, the FPI previously received support from the Jakarta Police and the TNI commander at that time: Gen. Wiranto. The links between certain elites and the FPI have been a source of FPI confidence.
The elites have nothing to do with religion, but their interest in the FPI is related to jockeying for political influence. The strength of the FPI represents the weaknesses of the government against violent organizations and the elites behind them.
“Surrounding the Tjilik Riwut plane strategy” is an expression of civil frustration against the ignorance of the central government in guarding long-standing religious tolerance and freedom. They are tired of language games played by the certain Jakarta elites in regard to these organizations.
In response to the ban in Central Kalimantan, the FPI elites said that the event “could potentially cause horizontal conflict and threaten the stability of the nation”. They also say that freedom of expression is not protected here. These statements are more relevant if addressed to the organization itself, rather than the Dayak protesters.
To protect religious harmony, the state could adopt the Tjilik Riwut strategy by suppressing the trend of religious violence through compulsory adherence of every organization to the guiding principles of Pancasila. This strategy could at least curb radical organizations from gathering further political influence. ●